Putin, via www.kremlin.ru |
For decades Putin has dominated Russian politics, and during that time many have credited Vladimir Putin with political savvy or even "genius". Personally I never saw him as anything but a thug, a man who made his way to the top by the easiest path possible - by killing his opponents. However even I would never have predicted that he would have decided to invade Ukraine in such poorly-planned and badly thought-out invasion.
During the months of December and January the question was repeatedly raised by various commentators that, if Putin was planning to invade Ukraine in a full-scale invasion, why was the force he was deploying insufficient for the task of occupying the country? People answered this in various ways: some said that the invasion must be a bluff, others that the invasion was going to happen but on a much smaller scale - for example that only the Donbas region would be occupied. For myself I did not know the answer to this question but simply assumed that he must have some kind of plan, probably the involving the use of a puppet government installed in Kiev.
It turns out that he did have a plan and it probably did involve a puppet government. However, whatever that plan was it was completely unrealistic and based on a total misunderstanding not only of the situation in Ukraine, but of the forces with which he planned to use for it. Quite how he ended up doing so we will only know for sure (if ever) from the history books, but the outline of Putin's misunderstanding of Ukraine can be seen in his speeches about Ukraine. Vladimir Putin apparently managed to convince himself that Ukraine simply wasn't a "real" country, and as such no-one would fight for it.
It turns out that he did have a plan and it probably did involve a puppet government. However, whatever that plan was it was completely unrealistic and based on a total misunderstanding not only of the situation in Ukraine, but of the forces with which he planned to use for it. Quite how he ended up doing so we will only know for sure (if ever) from the history books, but the outline of Putin's misunderstanding of Ukraine can be seen in his speeches about Ukraine. Vladimir Putin apparently managed to convince himself that Ukraine simply wasn't a "real" country, and as such no-one would fight for it.
Putin's misunderstanding of his own forces is also worthy of study. The performance of the Russian armed forces in this attack has quite simply been calamitous. The sight of a 40-mile-long of broken-down lorries, blocked in place for days and out of food and fuel, indicates that something is very wrong with Russian logistics, as does the apparent mobilising of civilian vehicles to replace trucks lost in Ukraine. Russian soldiers appear to have invaded Ukraine on 24 February with no idea even of where they were going or what they were doing until they started being shot at.
Putin apparently knew enough to try to keep his invasion plans secret (though western intelligence knew all about them) but not enough to know that the people he was asking to carry out the invasion also needed to know why they were doing what they were doing. The propaganda campaign launched before the war to blame Ukraine for starting it does not seem to have reached the average Russian private soldier, who finds himself in a Bruderkrieg against people who speak the same language as him but who also want no part in Putin's game. The result is the apparent desertions and abandonment of vehicles in running condition seen amongst Russian troops due to poor motivation.
The picture emerges of a man who has become duped by his own propaganda, who has come to believe that something is true simply because he says it is true. So in Putin's world Ukraine was not a country, there would be no fighting, and because of that no planning for actual war was needed as all that would happen was a "special military operation" of a few days. When this failed to work Putin unleashed artillery bombardments against the very people he said he was invading Ukraine to protect - the ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking population of Ukraine that is concentrated in northern Ukrainian cities like Kharkiv - but even this has failed thus far to force a Ukrainian collapse.
It seems that from here, barring some unforeseen collapse of the Ukrainians, Russian defeat is now possible, even likely. The Ukrainians are motivated by the best kind of patriotism to defend their country and their independence, and are now receiving more and more in the way of military hardware that will enable hem to take the fight to the Russians. The Ukrainians also likely now have the advantage of numbers, since they have recruited tens of thousands of volunteers since the start of the war whilst Russia is having trouble supplying even the troops it has in the country, who only ever roughly equalled its defenders.
Whilst I had previous said that I thought it likely that NATO would eventually intervene, if Ukraine can avoid a collapse, then the Ukrainians may survive this war with their independence without a direct NATO intervention. This will require massive military aid from NATO beyond what has already been sent, an including heavier weapons systems such as jet aircraft, helicopters, tanks, and artillery, as well as substantial logistical and humanitarian support.
All the same it would be foolish to count the Russians out at this stage. Russia has a long history of making disastrous starts to wars but muddling through to victory in the end. Their performance in this war is probably as bad or even worse than that in the First Chechen War - for example by this point in that war (i.e., 11 days in, on 22 December 1994) the Russians had occupied most of Northern Chechnya, reached the outskirts of Grozny on three sides, and were preparing their assault on the city - but they recovered even from that disaster.
It may be that Putin's forces can fix their supply problem, their morale problem, seize control of the air, bring in reserves to bolster their forces, all whilst dealing with an unprecedent economic meltdown brought on by sanctions. It is, however, hard to see at this point how all this could happen, but we should always be prepared for surprises.
If Putin cannot fix these problem then the hope is that he will simply accept defeat in Ukraine. If he can spin it as a victory of sorts he may do so. There is the definite fear, though, that he will not accept it and instead resort to nuclear weapons. That the prevailing winds from northern Ukraine blow across Russia and Belarus may militate against this, however, as Putin, who appears to be paranoid about his health, may not wish for himself at least to be exposed to radioactive fall out.
Use of smaller tactical nuclear weapons may also be militated against by the relatively dispersed nature of Ukrainian forces and their semi-guerrilla tactics giving no good targets for such weapons. Use for a simple "demonstration" against Ukrainian forces would cause consternation around the world, and might even make his remaining allies desert him out of a desire to avoid a nuclear holocaust, but it can't be ruled out.
As such, the situation looks much better than it did on the morning of 24 February when it appeared that Ukraine might simply be overwhelmed. Thousands have died, and will continue to die every day that this unnecessary, unprovoked, and illegal war continues, and so all we can do is hope it is brought to an end as soon as is compatible with Ukrainian independence and freedom.
4 comments:
I really hope I'm right about this, but the record of the last 77 years seems to suggest that nuclear weapons just don't get used. People have been scared of nuclear war many times before, usually with Russia, and it hasn't happened. I don't think it will this time.
As for why Putin started this war, it must be remembered that in normal times Ukraine is split between a pro-Russian and pro-Western element. Before Yanukovich got kicked out by demonstrators in 2014, he had after all won free and fair elections. In Crimea a majority of the local population genuinely welcomed the Russians (of course Crimea is not, historically, Ukrainian) and in the East of the country there were plenty of locals fighting for Russia.
Putin may have assumed that around half of Ukrainians would support him, but this clearly hasn't happened. Instead, in the Russian-speaking East as much as in the West almost all Ukrainians have rallied around their flag and their country.
Worth remembering that Zelensky was the "Russia-friendly" if not "pro-Russia" candidate in the 2019 Ukrainian elections. He is a "Russian-speaking Ukrainian".
I disagree that the 2014 invasions had any validity. A majority of those who voted in the 1991 referendum on Ukrainian independence in both Crimea and Sevastopol voted for independence as part of Ukraine. It is impossible to state that the invasion of Crimea was welcomed by a majority - there was never any actual valid measurement of opinion there about it. Population transfers since the invasion (large numbers of Russians have been moved into Crimea) further muddy the issue.
A pro-Russian militia was formed in Donbas in 2013-14, but it would never have existed at all without the FSB agents who essentially created and armed it, and it collapsed very quickly in the face of the Ukrainian army, there is no reason to believe it represented a majority view in Donbas. Large majorities in all the Donbas oblasts voted for Ukrainian independence in 1991. The area controlled by Russia's puppet states in Donbas is simply a result of direct Russian military intervention.
I agree that Putin's invasion simplifies the issue for everyone. Every smoke-screen by which he previously attacked Ukraine has been lifted, every bit of plausible deniability is gone. Personally, I never felt that these disguises ("polite people", "little green men", "Russian soldiers on holiday") should have been credited any validity at all and the response of the western powers should have been much stronger in 2014 - we might have avoided the present invasion had we done so.
@Ji Xiang - nuclear wars don't have to start with big bombs - they might begin with something on a tactical level, limited to one "theater". In the long run, every curse people develop will be put to use (again).
@FoarP - "Dziennik/Gazeta Prawna" appears to believe, too, that Putin was duped by his own propaganda. They conclude that this was "the worst thing to do for a leader who was going to war" ("das sei das Schlimmste, was ein Anführer tun könne, der in den Krieg ziehe").
But there are really to many possible explanations to mention - when I'm in a sarcastic mood, I'm thinking of the (rather disputed) idea that there are "balance sheet suicides".
When Putin looks back at his twenty-two years at the helm (plus his years as prime minister during the Yeltsin presidency), he might as well have hanged himself on January 23.
Would have spared Ukraine, Russia and the rest of the world quite a bit.
@Foarp: you're misunderstanding, I'm not saying the invasion of Crime in 2014 had any validity. The fact that many locals supported it is not enough to give it validity. I think national borders should be respected, except in extreme cases, for the sake of world peace, and Crimea belongs to Ukraine. The so-called "oppression of Russian-speakers" they used to justify the invasion is nonsense.
Having said that, it is a simple fact that there were, until a few-months ago, quite a lot of Ukrainians who supported Russia and Putin, especially in the East and South. Any serious book about Ukraine will confirm this. Or just look at this Guardian report on Odessa: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/07/beyond-understanding-odesa-braced-to-see-if-putin-attacks-city-of-such-resonance-for-russians
Here's a quote: "In light of the shocking attacks on civilians over the past two weeks, even many of those who remained staunchly pro-Russian are re-examining their convictions.
Alexander Prigarin, an Odesa-based anthropologist, described his current mood as “confusion”. The events of 2014 had only strengthened his affection for Russia, he said, but the sight of Russia attacking Ukrainian cities with rockets and missiles had completely floored him."
The Guardian hardly has pro-Putin sympathies, and yet they are happy to admit that many Odessans sympathized with Russia until the invasion began. It is clearly the same in Crimea. The Tatars are generally opposed to Russia's annexation, but they were deported in mass by Stalin, so few remain. There are also ethnically Russian Crimeans who opposed Putin's invasion, bravely, but it is not clear if they are a majority. Feelings in 1991 may have been very different from feelings in 2014, by which time Russia was also perceived by many as more prosperous and stable than Ukraine.
I'm not bringing these facts up to justify Russia's invasion, but to explain why Putin might have believed it would be successful. Recognizing these facts is not to justify Russia's conduct since 2014, or to believe the nonsense about Russian soldiers on holiday and little green men. But it is not useful to flatly deny the reality of widespread pro-Russian sentiment (now almost extinguished by the crazy invasion) in some areas of Ukraine because you hate Putin, or think that anyone who brings it up is apologizing for Putin. When we do this, it only makes us look misinformed and biased to the other side. The Ukrainian issue *is* complex, but right now it's been simplified by an appalling invasion which the entire civilized world must oppose without hesitation.
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